With reference to Lambertini (2003) , Lin (2004) correctly points out that, if R&D efforts for process innovation are endogenous, then process and product R&D are strategic complements. Then, he also proves that the opposite holds when spillovers are nil. Objecting to Lin's second claim, I show that monopoly profits are everywhere increasing in the extent of information sharing within the firm. Consequently, the full internalisation of spillovers restores the complementarity between process R&D and product proliferation.
Introduction
Lin's (2004) valuable paper accurately investigates two aspects that I have neglected in Lambertini (2003) . As a preliminary step, recall that the monopolist has to set output levels q i , the R&D effort for process innovation, k, and the number of product varieties, n, to maximise:
where parameter γ ∈ [−1, 1] measures the degree of demand complementarity/substitutability between any pair of varieties, F is the exogenous fixed cost of introducing a single variety, and parameter θ ≥ 0 measures economies (or diseconomies) of scope in expanding the product range. For brevity, I will skip any further details concerning the construction of (1), referring the reader to Lambertini (2003) and Lin (2004) . Lin's arguments run as follows. First, he points out that, in deriving Lemma 1 (Lambertini, 2003 , p. 569) one should take into account the endogenous variation of the monopolist's R&D effort for process innovation, k, induced by a change in the number of products, n. That is to say, I have evaluated only the partial derivative of the equilibrium marginal cost w.r.t. n, instead of taking the total differential. This point is indeed correct, and allows us to highlight that the incentive to reduce marginal cost is indeed increasing, rather than decreasing, in the number of varieties being supplied. In his section 3.2, Lin correctly explains the complementarity between expanding the product range and lowering the marginal production cost through an argument based upon the fact that, in general, a firm's incentive to carry out process R&D is positively related to the output level. This is due to the fact that output expansion translates into cost savings. Alternatively, the incentive to carry out R&D increases in n as a remedy to the cannibalisation effect associated with any increase in the number of varieties. For a given market size, measured by α − c, introducing an additional variety produces a negative externality on the existing ones. This can be effectively counterbalanced by lowering the marginal production cost, i.e., expanding market size. As the optimal level of n is approached, the cannibalisation effect becomes more relevant; consequently, the optimal R&D effort also increases.
The second route taken by Lin extends the analysis to deal with the link between the presence of spillovers (or scope economies) in the R&D activity for process innovation and the number of products offered by the monopolist. Lin modifies the process R&D technology, assuming that each variety i = 1, 2, ...n be characterised by its own marginal cost c i = c − K i , where
is the technological spillover that the lab carrying out R&D to reduce product i's marginal cost receives from the other labs working for the monopolist (as in d' Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988) . Then, Lin proves in his Lemma 2 that, if β = 0, the incentive towards process innovation is decreasing in n. In the next section, I intend to show that, while Lin's conclusion is formally correct, it is nonetheless very unlikely to be observed at the monopoly equilibrium, if the firm has the opportunity to internalise such technological externalities.
Spillovers in process R&D and the incentive towards product proliferation
To the aim of the present analysis, product innovation itself can be considered as exogenous. Therefore, if n labs invest in R&D to reduce product-specific marginal costs, the objective of the monopolist is:
This, except for the (negligible) fact that the cost function associated with product proliferation has disappeared, coincide with expression (4.1) in Lin (2004). 1 Using expression (9) in Lambertini (2003, p. 565), the profit function (2) can be simplified as follows:
having imposed the symmetry conditions k i = k and c i = c for all i, which is acceptable insofar as we are considering a monopolist. This also entails that
. Now I can take the first order condition w.r.t. k :
yielding the optimal R&D investment of any single lab:
In β = 0, k * obviously coincides with the expression found by Lin (2004).
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The partial derivative of k * w.r.t. n has the following feature:
whose sign depends of course on β. If β is sufficiently close to zero, the r.h.s. in (6) is negative, as noted by Lin, while the opposite applies if β is sufficiently close to one. Hence, the effect of a change in n on the incentive to increase productive efficiency seems ambiguous at first sight. However, it may no longer be so if one takes into account that a monopolist is, by definition, in the best possible position to fully internalise technological spillovers, 3 that is, to drive β to one if it is profitable to do so. Indeed, it can be quickly shown that, if this is the case, then product proliferation fosters process innovation. Substituting k * in (3), profits simplify as follows:
Now observe that:
which is always positive. Therefore, if the monopolist can endogenise spillovers, it will set β = 1. In such a circumstance, ∂k * /∂n ∝ n 2 + 4ξ (1 − γ) > 0. On this basis, I may state: Proposition 1 Suppose the monopolist activates n labs for process innovation. Ceteris paribus, if such labs fully share their respective information, profits are maximised. Moreover, under full information sharing, R&D investment for process innovation monotonically increases in n.
As a last step, I would like to stress that the model presented in Lambertini (2003) does not coincide with the case of n labs and full information, 4 since there it is assumed that one single lab works out the same productive technology for all varieties. If β = 1, (7) becomes:
where (n) indicates that n labs operate, while, using (1) and c = c − k, the corresponding expression with a single lab obtains:
with Π M (n) > Π M (1) for all n > 1. This is a straightforward consequence of the decreasing returns to scale affecting R&D activity, implied by the quadratic cost function. Under increasing marginal costs of R&D, the monopolist would be better off by activating n labs rather than a single one, so as to smooth the innovation costs (and exploit full spillovers). However, is it realistic to suppose that a firm supplying n symmetrically differentiated varieties of the same good would run n independent labs, trying then to maximise information sharing among them? I believe this is not the case,
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although the present model seems to suggest so. Rather, in order to properly address this issue, one should model the presence of other synergies in addition to spillovers. For instance, the reduction of fixed costs associated to R&D labs (which are modelled neither here nor in Lambertini (2003) ), or other beneficial effects that could ultimately affect the size of parameter ξ. If ξ were inversely related to n, this could summarise the fact that concentrating all the personnel working on process R&D in a single lab would not only facilitate information sharing but also produce a Mashallian effect generated by the fact that the resulting think tank would outperform the sum of its alternatively independent parts. A sketch of this idea can be given in the following terms. Relabel the R&D cost parameter, respectively, as ξ (1) if only one lab is active, and ξ (n) if n > 1 labs are active. Then, one immediately obtains Π M (1) > Π M (n) iff ξ (1) < ξ (n) /n.
